


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8 October 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Yugoslavia-US-USSR: (Belgrade's initial reaction to US congressional action denying Yugoslavia most-favored-nation trading status has been restrained.)

(Radio Belgrade stressed that the congressional action had been opposed by the Kennedy administration and the US press. It predicted that an attempt would be made to reverse Congress' stand at the next session. [REDACTED])

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[REDACTED] (Belgrade probably believes any drop in trade with the West will be somewhat offset by expanded trade with the bloc. On 4 October, after several months of negotiation, Belgrade and Moscow signed a trade protocol for 1963 which sets trade goals at more than double the estimated current annual amount.)

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(Although Soviet-Yugoslav trade fell substantially below targets in 1961 and apparently will this year also, Tito probably expects the improved political climate between the two states to facilitate realization of the 1963 goals. There are also indications that the satellites will soon take steps to increase trade with Belgrade.) [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Common Market - Britain: (In the ministerial meeting opening in Brussels today all Common Market (EEC) countries except France apparently intend to support Britain's efforts to conclude the EEC-UK accession talks by Christmas, but none seems prepared to make major concessions.)

(Since mid-September Britain's chief negotiator, Edward Heath, has met bilaterally with the ministers of all the EEC countries, except France. They were sympathetic to Britain's need to find further assurances for the Commonwealth, but cautious as to specific proposals. Several expressed reservations about the applications for EEC ties by Britain's EFTA partners. Spaak is said to have warned that if London insists on resolving the problems of the three EFTA neutrals before signing an accession agreement, UK entry would be delayed until "after the British elections in 1964.")

(France is expected to remain tough on substantive issues and to insist in particular that London accept existing regulations for the EEC's agricultural fund--the issue on which the talks adjourned last August.)

(A Foreign Office official said Heath considered his meeting with Adenauer on 1 October "generally unsatisfactory," and remained doubtful whether Adenauer would support UK membership to the extent of straining close French-German relations.)

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Cuba: Castro's political machine, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), is increasingly adopting procedures characteristic of bloc Communist parties.

In recent weeks there has been an increase in the number of meetings at labor centers throughout the country where the "most exemplary" workers are "elected" to ORI cells. On 2 October the ORI national directorate established the category of "member-candidate" for Party aspirants, and began issuing Party cards.

The ORI is now frequently referred to by regime leaders as the United Party of the Socialist Revolution, the name the ORI has been slated to assume when its organizational structure is complete. Castro stated publicly on 29 September that by 1 January 1963, the fourth anniversary of his coming to power, "we will have a strong and well-organized party."

The key six-man secretariat of the ORI national directorate is composed of Fidel and Raul Castro as first and second secretaries; Che Guevara; President Dorticos; veteran Communist Blas Roca; and Emilio Aragonés, a leader of Castro's 26th of July Movement.

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*Congo: (Tshombé now states that he is ready to take a number of specific steps toward implementation of the UN plan for the Congo without waiting--as he has previously insisted--on prior agreement on a new constitution.)

(In his talks with Under Secretary McGhee last week, Tshombé promised prompt moves to work out a cease-fire accord, reopen the Lubilash bridge on the main route to Leopoldville, permit rail and road movement of UN supplies into Elisabethville, and speed up the work of the joint Leopoldville-Katangan commissions.)

(McGhee says he is by no means yet convinced that Tshombé will actually fulfill all his promises, but at the same time believes that Tshombé's agreement on these and other points is about as much as could be expected at this time.)

(Tshombé emphasized again and again to McGhee that the heart of the matter in his dispute with Leopoldville is the drafting of a satisfactory constitution. He voiced great distrust of Adoula as well as suspicion that the constitution as drafted by UN experts was nothing more than a rewrite of the old one, with too little decentralization of power. Tshombé also made clear that he rejects the idea envisaged in the UN plan of a 50-50 split between Elisabethville and the central government of Katangan revenues and foreign-exchange earnings.)

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